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<Article> 
 
SCIENCE AND LAW IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: THE CASE OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Aleksandra Čavoški1 
 
Abstract: This article draws on empirical research conducted with European Commission 
officials in three Directorate-Generals (DGs) and its other services on their perception of how 
the legislative and policy-making process facilitates the interaction of science and 
environmental law. This article deploys Sheila Jasanoff’s theoretical framework of co-
production as an important lens to examine how the European Commission creates this 
interaction of science and law in environmental policy-making and identifies how the 
Commission incorporates different voices and stakeholders in this policy area. The 
Commission can be seen as a vehicle of co-production of science and law in EU environmental 
policy by building strong expert identities, putting in place institutional processes and 
instruments and creating discourse between scientists and lawyers leading to outputs of co-
production. It is argued that in actively facilitating co-production, the Commission underpins 
the legislative and policy-making process with its institutional values. 
 
Keywords: European Commission; Co-production; Jasanoff; Environmental law and policy; 
Interaction of science and law 
  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Environmental law and policy are infused with science; their production involves both 
scientists and lawyers and the outputs are shaped by science. However, the extent to which 
scientific knowledge is properly integrated into policy making is often unclear. This article 
draws on empirical research conducted with European Commission officials in three 
                                                          
1 University of Birmingham (United Kingdom). 
Email: A.Cavoski@bham.ac.uk. 
I am grateful to Steven Vaughan, Fiona de Londras, Robert Lee and Conor Murphy for their comments. I am also 
thankful to the anonymous reviewers and editors for their feedback. 
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Directorate-Generals (DGs) and several other Commission services to examine their perception 
of how the legislative process facilitates and ensures the incorporation of science into European 
Union (EU) environmental law. The article argues that the Commission acts as a vehicle of co-
production of science and law in EU environmental policy by building strong expert identities, 
putting in place institutional processes and instruments, and creating discourse between 
scientists and lawyers leading to what Sheila Jasanoff calls a ‘serviceable truth’.2 The 
Commission acts to embed scientific knowledge ‘in social practices, identities, norms, 
conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions’.3 It is argued that in actively facilitating 
co-production, the Commission underpins the legislative and policy-making process with its 
institutional values. In particular, it creates the context of independence and trust which ensures 
that scientific knowledge that has been incorporated into law has not been ‘sacrificed on the 
altar of an impossible scientific certainty’4 and the policy preferences of different stakeholders 
are taken into account.  
 
This article deploys Jasanoff’s theoretical framework of co-production as an important lens to 
examine how the European Commission creates the nexus of science and law in environmental 
policy making and explains how the Commission incorporates different voices and 
stakeholders in this policy area. Moreover, the article engages with this analytical framework 
to develop an empirically-grounded understanding of how the Commission acts at this nexus. 
This concept is of particular importance for the EU where this interaction occurs in a multi-
level governance arena, with the interests of numerous actors and institutions holding different 
preferences and policy traditions. This is especially pertinent to environmental policy where 
                                                          
2 S. Jasanoff, ‘Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy’ (2015) 93(7) Texas Law Review, pp. 
1723-49. 
3 S. Jasanoff, ‘The Idiom of Co-production’, in S. Jasanoff (ed.), States of Knowledge: The Co-production of 
Science and Social Order (Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-12, at 3. 
4 Jasanoff, n. 2 above, p. 1730. 
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the Commission, with its exclusive power of legislative initiative, mediates between different 
interests and facilitates the interaction between science and law. Though the Commission, in 
translating science (in particular natural science) into law, is specifically concerned with 
maintaining the landscape of fact, one cannot overlook the importance of the context in which 
this social interaction between the legal and scientific domains occurs.  
 
Thus, this empirically grounded study is of multi-faceted significance both for EU policy 
making and more broadly. It contributes to our understanding of how the Commission acts in 
areas of legal regulation heavily shaped by scientific insights and how policy making occurs in 
those areas. The study also engages with the question of deference to science and the 
Commission’s ability to integrate scientific knowledge into law and policy that is fit for 
purpose.5 Furthermore, the study makes a significant contribution to the socio-legal research 
on the interaction of science and law within the European Commission, especially in 
environmental legal research. There is a growing interest in the interaction between law and 
science and this article utilizes primary data to examine the legislative process as well as the 
perception of this interaction by officials in the European Commission. Finally, this article’s 
application of Jasanoff’s co-production idiom to the EU environmental legislative process not 
only demonstrates its relevance to the EU multi-level policy-making process but also provides 
an explanatory model to examine the broader social processes that incorporate scientific 
knowledge into law. It has important purchase in environmental policy making by shedding 
light on how scientists and policy makers bridge the gap between law and empirical evidence 
in the legislative process.  
 
2. CO-PRODUCTION AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
                                                          
5 Ibid., p. 1724-25.  
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Though cooperation between scientists and lawyers revolves primarily around questions of 
evidence,6 the mutual reliance between the two disciplines is prominent in the policy-making 
process. This interaction between science and other social processes is best explored by 
Jasanoff’s idiom of co-production which provides ‘explanatory power by thinking of natural 
and social orders as being produced together’.7 This allows us to examine how science, in 
particular natural sciences becomes part of the decision-making process.8 Co-production 
entails the idea that science and social activity, including law, cannot be divorced from each 
other and they both support and shape each other. As Jasanoff argues, ‘society cannot function 
without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without appropriate social support’.9  
 
This concept has been part and parcel of science and technology studies;10 yet its reach is wider, 
including its deployment to political and social sciences. This concept is particularly significant 
to environmental legal scholarship as legal regulation in this area is heavily shaped by scientific 
insights. However, it has been under-utilized in legal research. Of particular importance in 
developing the idiom of co-production is the collected volume on co-production of EU expert 
and executive power in regulating health and environmental issues, which provides some 
excellent examples of co-production in specific contexts including law, governance, political 
science, and science and technology studies.11 The most recent work of Maria Lee and others 
focuses on construction, use and impact of knowledge in administrative decision making by 
                                                          
6 Ibid., p. 1723. 
7 Jasanoff, n. 3 above, p. 2. 
8 Ibid., p. 3. 
9 Ibid, pp. 2-3 See also A.C. Keller, Science in Environmental Policy: The Politics of Objective Advice (The MIT 
Press, 2009). 
10 See more in S. Jasanoff, G.E. Markle, J.C. Petersen & T. Pinch (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology 
Studies, Revised Edition (Sage, 2001).  
11 M. Weimer & A. de Ruijter (eds), Regulating Risks in the European Union: The Co-production of Expert and 
Executive Power (Hart Publishing, 2017).  
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examining the planning process for major off-shore winds farms through the lens of co-
production.12  
 
While there is a growing research on the interaction of science and law in social and political 
science, there is lack of primary data in socio-legal research on the process of incorporating 
science into EU environmental legislation given the importance of the Commission’s exclusive 
power of legislative initiative at the EU level. Previous empirical studies on EU policy making 
and expertise have been predominantly carried out within political science.13 Scholars in this 
field have primarily focused on the role of external expert groups at the EU level by looking at 
the activity of external expert groups in EU policy14, knowledge utilization,15 the role of 
national officials attending Commission committees16 and views of external scientists in 
providing expertise to the European Commission.17 This article focuses on how officials in the 
European Commission perceive the interaction of science and law in the environmental 
legislative process. It also adds to scholarship on the role of in-house providers of scientific 
input and other Commission services such as the Legal Service of the Commission.  
 
                                                          
12 M. Lee et al, ‘Techniques of Knowing in Administration: Co‐production, Models, and Conservation Law’ 
(2018) 45(3) Journal of Law and Society, pp. 427-56. 
13 The work recognizes the significant empirical research by political scientists with regard to environmental 
policy and EU institutions, including the European Commission, as well as work on compliance and effectiveness 
of EU environmental policy. Examples include: A. Weale et al., Environmental Governance in Europe: An Ever 
Closer Ecological Union (Oxford University Press, 2000); C. Knill, S. Heichel & D. Arndt, ‘Really a Front-runner, 
really a Straggler? Of Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union and Beyond: A Quantitative 
Policy Perspective’ (2012) 48 Energy Policy, pp. 36-45. 
14 See Å. Gornitzka & U. Sverdrup, ‘Who Consults? The Configuration of Expert Groups in the European Union’ 
(2008) 31(4) West European Politics, pp. 725-50. 
15 See C. Boswell, ‘The Political Functions of Expert Knowledge: Knowledge and Legitimation in European 
Union Immigration Policy’ (2008) 15(4) Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 471-88. 
16 See M. Egeberg, G. Schaefer & J. Trondal, ‘The Many Faces of EU Committee Governance’ (2003) 26(3) West 
European Politics, pp. 19-40. 
17 See D. Rimkutė & M. Haverland, ‘How does the European Commission use Scientific Expertise? Results from 
a Survey of Scientific Members of the Commission’s Expert Committees’ (2015) 13(4) Comparative European 
Politics, pp. 430–49. 
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As this article deploys the lens of co-production to examine the Commission’s work in the 
environmental policy area, it is helpful to briefly clarify and contextualize this concept within 
the European Commission. In developing the concept of co-production, Jasanoff argues that 
there is no strict dichotomy between science and social activity. Science cannot be perceived 
as a discrete, empirically based discipline that operates in isolation from other social activities; 
rather it feeds into social and institutional activity. Science and social activity are intertwined 
and they reinforce and shape each other. Thus, co-production as a model explains the context 
in which those different domains interact. This process is not linear and its explanatory value 
lies in its ability to demonstrate how decisions in policy areas are heavily reliant on scientific 
evidence which in itself is value-laden.18 Law is also a social construct that operates alongside 
other social activities, in particular science, technology and medicine.19 As McDougal and 
Lasswell argue, authoritative decisions in law are inextricable components of social processes 
and ‘such decisions are made in response to claims about particular interactions or events in 
social process’.20 These views are deeply rooted in the work of political and legal philosophers 
such as Montesquieu, who advocated that law cannot be examined in isolation from other social 
processes, as it is ‘an integral, organic component of a community’s total culture’.21  
 
In examining the literature on the interplay between science and social activity, including law, 
Jasanoff makes a distinction between constitutive and interactional strands.22 The constitutive 
strand is concerned with ways in which stability is created and maintained, while the 
interactional strand is concerned with elucidating ‘myriad mutual accommodations between 
                                                          
18 Jasanoff, n. 3 above, pp. 3-4 and p. 277. 
19 See M. Lynch, ‘Circumscribing Expertise: Membership Categories in Courtroom Testimony’, in S. Jasanoff 
(ed.), States of Knowledge: the Co-production of Science and Social Order (Routledge, 2006), pp. 161-180, at 
162-3.  
20 M.S. McDougal & H.D. Lasswell, ‘The Relation of Law to Social Process: Trends in Theories about Law’ 
(1976) 37 U. Pitt. L. Rev., pp. 465-85, at 465. 
21 Ibid., p. 469. 
22 S. Jasanoff, ‘Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society’, in S. Jasanoff (ed.), States of Knowledge: the Co-
production of Science and Social Order (Routledge, 2006), pp. 13-45, at pp. 18-9. 
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social and scientific practices that occur within existing socio-technical dispensations during 
times of conflict and change’.23 This article seeks to understand the interactional strand; the 
policy-making process which requires accommodation and compromise within an already 
structured environment. The interaction of law and science in EU environmental policy and 
lawmaking within the Commission is examined through the four main pathways of co-
production identified by Jasanoff: making identities, making institutions, making discourses, 
and making representations.24 Making identities has a two-fold function. It allows for a 
redefinition and maintenance of various identities which should bring credibility and 
independence to co-production. Co-production also brings to the forefront expert identities 
which are particularly important in policy areas heavily reliant on scientific knowledge, such 
as environmental policy. Institutions, as a second pathway of co-production, can be regarded 
primarily as vehicles through which the interaction of science and law occurs. Policy making 
takes place through institutions, in this case the European Commission which deploys various 
processes and instruments that facilitate problem solving, interpretation of evidence, 
standardization of scientific methods, lawmaking and enforcement.25 Moreover, institutions 
play an important role in constructing the institutional culture and agenda, by nurturing 
overarching values shared by their members.26 Making discourses is particularly salient to the 
interaction of science and law due to different modi operandi of the two disciplines. As many 
novel phenomena in nature and society are surrounded by a degree of uncertainty, constructing 
discourses between lawyers and scientists allows for a better understanding and regulation of 
these phenomena. Finally, making representations unveils the artefacts of co-production by 
simultaneously ensuring the scientific integrity of the output and its applicability to those for 
whom it is intended.  In the legal context, the artefacts of co-production will typically include 
                                                          
23 Ibid., p. 19. 
24 Ibid., p. 38. 
25 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
26 Ibid., p. 40. 
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legislation and court rulings, though in recent years soft law documents such as policy papers 
have become increasingly important.  
  
An examination of the interaction between science and law through co-production has 
important purchase in the analysis of environmental law and policy, which is one of the most 
intensive science-based policies. Furthermore, the EU is distinctive due to its multi-level and 
multi-national layers of interaction bringing together various actors and interest groups which 
have become part of the decision-making process. Equally, scientists and officials from 
different professional backgrounds, working in both national and EU institutions, undoubtedly 
bring their own individual and national identities which shape the discourse within EU 
institutions in a specific way. Moreover, diverse legal, social and cultural traditions between 
member states have an impact on this interaction.  
 
The European Commission is at the forefront of co-production in the EU with its exclusive 
powers of legislative initiative prescribed by Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU)27 and enforcement powers prescribed by Articles 258 and 260 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).28 Over the years, the Commission has been 
recognized as a ’guardian of the treaties’ and a ‘vehicle of a federalist agenda’.29 The 
Commission has proven itself instrumental in forming and maintaining its own identity as a 
central pillar that underpins EU environmental policy. Furthermore, the Commission has made 
significant contributions in developing this area.30 This was achieved by developing its role as 
                                                          
27 Lisbon (Portugal), 13 Dec. 2007, in force 1 Dec. 2009, [2007] OJ C 306/1, available at: 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text. 
28 Lisbon (Portugal), 13 Dec. 2007, in force 1 Dec. 2009 [2012] OJ C 326/47, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF. 
29 See N. Nugent & M. Rhinard, The European Commission (2nd Edition), (Red Globe Press, 2015). 
30 See more about the development, operation and functions of the European Commission in N. Nugent & M. 
Rhinard, n. 26 above,  and A. Jordan & C. Adelle (eds), Environmental Policy in the EU: Actors, Institutions and 
Processes, 3rd Edn (Routledge, 2012).  
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the primary actor in creating the setting for the co-production of science and law to happen.31 
The Commission uses various methods to facilitate this interaction and mediates between 
different interests involved in the policy-making process aligned with the four main co-
production pathways identified by Jasanoff.32 As those pathways of co-production are 
interlinked and form part of the legislative and policy-making process, they may be regarded 
as benchmarks for assessing co-production in different settings, including the Commission.  
 
In making identities, the Commission manages to accommodate different national and 
professional identities and build distinct expert identities of actors involved in co-production, 
which is an important feature of the European integration project.33 This expert identity 
contains both organizational and individual expert identities of actors which are closely linked 
to the Commission’s institutional values. Moreover, the Commission successfully built an 
institutional framework to facilitate co-production. It is the vehicle and the venue for this 
interaction of science and law to occur. Co-production happens through institutionalization in 
which robust legal and policy processes are deployed to assess, interpret and incorporate 
scientific knowledge into law. Aware of the importance of language as the main tool in making 
discourses, the Commission must overcome differences between scientific and legal language. 
To that end, the Commission has to ensure that the translation of scientific knowledge into law 
reduces the risks of both over- and under-regulation. The Commission produces legislative 
proposals as a physical outcome of co-production containing acceptable levels of scientific 
knowledge that is linked to all three above mentioned instruments. This outcome is not a 
                                                          
31 See S. Kingston, V. Heyvaert & A. Čavoški, European Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017).  
32 See Jasanoff, n. 22 above, p. 38. 
33 See I. Bellier, ‘A Europeanized Elite? An Anthropology of European Commission Officials’ (2000) 14 
Yearbook of European Studies, pp. 135-56. 
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‘mirror of reality’34 but the result of the social interaction between science and law within the 
Commission.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
This study offers an insight into the context the Commission creates to facilitate the co-
production of scientific knowledge into the environmental legislative process. Furthermore, it 
provides us with a deeper understanding of the perceptions and views of Commission officials 
on how the legislative and policy-making process enables the incorporation of science into law 
and the values that underpin this process. This article draws on 18 interviews with officials in 
three DGs and other services of the European Commission, including DG Environment, DG 
Research, DG Agriculture, the Legal Service of the Commission, the Joint Research Centre 
(JRC)35 and the Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM). Interviews took place between July 2017 
and December 2017 following ethical approval from the University of Birmingham. The scope 
of this research was limited to the co-production of science and law in the European 
Commission throughout the legal drafting procedure and enforcement procedure. An 
examination of the co-production in the European Parliament and the Council as the main 
legislators in the EU will be part of subsequent research. The research methodology was 
informed by the choice of co-production as a conceptual framework for this article. The 
empirical research was conducted through interviews as the most appropriate method for data 
collection. Information obtained through interviews about the process and perceptions of the 
interaction of science and law could not have been obtained through doctrinal analysis, surveys 
or other social and legal research methods. Interviews allowed for data collection in an 
                                                          
34 Jasanoff, n. 3 above, p. 3. 
35 Joint Research Centre is the Commission’s in-house provider of independent scientific knowledge at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en.  
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interactive setting, which was beneficial for understanding the broader institutional context in 
which co-production occurs.36  
 
Interviewees were senior and mid-ranking officials in the European Commission who could be 
categorized as EU elites. Vaughan explains the notion of elites and points out that their status, 
their employment, or title or role or function in society ‘gives them a degree of power, privilege 
and expertise not enjoyed by the majority’.37 In this empirical study, gaining access to 
Commission elites was particularly important both for their expertise in chosen areas and for 
their decision-making power. Access to elites is often perceived as a particular challenge for a 
researcher,38 yet Commission officials were very open and willing to share their understanding 
of the science and law interaction.  
 
Interviews took place in person (both one-to-one interviews and small group interviews at 
interviewees’ place of work) or over the phone, lasting between 40 and 60 minutes. The 
author’s approach was to send an initial email to the Deputy Director-General or Deputy Head 
of Unit. Interviewees received a semi-structured interview guide in advance, which specified 
numerous queries on the interaction of science and law in legal drafting. These included 
questions on the stages of legal drafting, involvement of experts, the quality of scientific advice, 
independence of evidence, the role of the JRC and Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM), 
language, implementation and enforcement of EU environmental law. All interviewees agreed 
to participate in the research on the understanding that their contributions would remain 
anonymous. The author used anonymized identifiers to denote the interviewees. It is important 
                                                          
36 See more in S. Qu & J. Dumay, ‘The Qualitative Research Interview’ (2011) 8(3) Qualitative Research in 
Accounting and Management, pp. 238-64. 
37 S. Vaughan, ‘Elite and Elite-lite Interviewing: Managing our Industrial Legacy’, in A. Franklin & P. Blyton 
(eds), Researching Sustainability (Earthscan, 2011), pp. 105-119, at 106. 
38 Vaughan, n. 37 above, p. 110. 
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to point out that the empirical research did not examine the relationship between the 
Commission and the EU agencies regulating certain environmental or cross-cutting issues.39 
The role and significance of external experts assisting the Commission in the legislative process 
is not part of this study.   
 
4. PERSPECTIVES FROM THE COMMISSION  
 
4.1. Making identities in EU environmental policy 
 
Making identities represents the first of the four pathways of co-production and it is particularly 
salient to this process as it allows us to examine the formation and maintenance of identities in 
different contexts.40 As Rabeharisoa and Callon point out, ‘co-production translates an 
intertwined transformation of relations between science and society’.41 One of the 
transformations manifests itself in identity building, which includes the reaffirmation of 
existing and emergence of new identities.42 Jasanoff proposes the idea of collective, individual 
and other regional identities (such as ‘European’) within the co-production idiom.43 In 
examining the interaction between science and law through co-production, we are primarily 
interested in the identity of the expert,44 as the notion of ‘expert’ is often intertwined with the 
notion of science.45 As Lynch points out, concepts like ‘science’ and ‘experts’ have various 
                                                          
39 Significant empirical work has already been conducted with regard to agencies (e.g., E.I.L. Vos, ‘EU Agencies 
on the Move: Challenges Ahead’,(2018) 1 SIEPS, pp. 1-49; E.I.L. Vos, ‘EU agencies and Independence’, in D. 
Ritleng (ed.), Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union: The Collected 
Courses of the Academy of European Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 206-27.   
40 Jasanoff, n. 22 above, p. 39. 
41 V. Rabeharisoa & M. Callon, ‘Patients and Scientists in French Muscular Dystrophy Research’, in S. Jasanoff 
(ed.), States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order (Routledge, 2006), pp. 142-160, at 
142. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Jasanoff, n. 22 above, p. 39. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Lynch, n. 19 above, p. 161. 
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usages, including the denotation of someone with authority and credibility in formal and 
informal social interactions.46 
 
Co-production of identities between scientists, lawyers, bureaucrats and politicians takes place 
within the Commission. Besides specific individual identities held by Commission officials, 
the Commission has its own collective identity as a collegiate body. The formation of identities 
has been examined in the wider EU context, through studies on the identities of officials in the 
European Commission. These studies have focused, in particular, on how different nationalities 
and cultures affect the shaping of a common European identity and Commission decision 
making.47 The plethora of national and cultural identities is unsurprising as the Commission is 
involved in multi-level, multi-national decision-making processes and identities are formed 
across different institutional contexts. With regard to environmental issues, the various 
identities include those of civil servants in DGs responsible for environmental or cross-sectoral 
issues, of people working in other Commission services such as JRC or the Legal Service of 
the Commission, and of national experts who interact with the Commission through the legal 
drafting process.  
 
Identity is not a static concept; identity building through co-production allows one to 
differentiate oneself from others and define one’s role.48 Expert identity entails someone with 
specialized skills and knowledge.49 In the EU context, the notion of an expert is often associated 
                                                          
46 Lynch, n. 19 above, p. 161. 
47 M. Egeberg, ‘Organization and Nationality in the European Commission Services’ (1996) 74(4) Public 
Administration, pp. 721-35; E. Tóth, ‘National Cultures and European Identity: The Process of Engrenage among 
European Commission Civil Servants’ (2007) 29(3) Society and Economy, pp. 413-31; Bellier, n. 33 above.  
48 R. Wodak, ‘National and Transnational Identities and other Identities Constructed in Interviews with EU 
Officials’, in R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse-Kappen & M.B. Brewer (eds), Transnational Identities: Becoming 
European in the EU (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 97-128,  at p. 99. 
49 See more in R.D. Putnam, ‘Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Assessment 
of the Theory of Technocracy’ (1977) 10(3) Comparative Political Studies, pp. 383-412. 
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with the term of technocrat who ‘exercises authority by virtue of his technical competence’50 
or expertise and is often insensitive to conflicting social interests in policy making.51 Expert 
identity undoubtedly provides credentials to one’s role. Moreover, Laffan argues identity is 
important in indicating a degree of commonality, shared values and new roles in the EU.52 Scott 
emphasizes the importance of an organizational identity providing actors with ‘a core set of 
normative values around which they craft their narratives’, including those around the science 
and law interaction.53 
 
The interview data supported the thesis that expert identity is built through co-production. 
Various identities formed in the Commission are subsumed under the notion of the ‘expert’ 
identity shaped through co-production. In co-producing environmental policy, ‘expert’ seems 
to trump other identities formed within the general context of the European Commission. Thus, 
expert identity becomes the primary identity of Commission officials in this policy area, 
sidelining all other identities officials may have. Moreover, interviewees pointed out that their 
individual and organizational identities in the Commission sit comfortably within the wider 
notion of expert identity in science more generally. These identities can be categorized in terms 
of their key characteristics, such as distinctiveness, endurance and centrality.54 
 
The empirical research unveiled the importance of the interviewees’ distinctive expert identity 
which is shaped through co-production. A defining characteristic of DG Environment, 
recognized by their colleagues in other DGs and Commission services, was said to be its staff’s 
                                                          
50 Putnam, n. 49 above, p. 384. 
51 Ibid., p. 404. 
52 B. Laffan, ‘The European Union and its Institutions as “Identity Builders’”, in R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse-Kappen 
& M.B. Brewer (eds), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 
75-96, at 78. 
53 W.R. Scott, Institutions and Organizations 4th ed (Sage, 2014), at p. 138. 
54 M. Alvesson, ‘Organisational Culture: Meaning, Discourse and Identity’ in N.M. Ashkanasy, C.P. M. Wilderom 
& M.F. Peterson (eds), Handbook of Organisational Culture and Climate (Sage, 2011), pp. 11-28, at 21. 
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expertise and experience in environmental issues. This aligns with the characteristics of a 
distinctive identity;55 in this case a scientific or expert identity which distinguishes persons 
working in this field from others working within the Commission. Without prompting, civil 
servants in other DGs and Commission services spoke about DG Environment as having very 
qualified staff and ‘extremely experienced people’56. For example: 
 
I must say, the level of qualification at DG Environment, with the people I am working with, is very 
high. (R4) 
 
The formation of an ‘expert’ identity is important within DGs, not least because it can signal 
what Commission officials perceive to be the distinctive nature of the DG and provides them 
with a particular status that may make them stand out within the Commission on certain policy 
matters. Having a distinctive identity certainly is not unique to DG Environment. DG 
Agriculture, for example, ‘wants to be very modern’ and had to change its image as being 
‘reactionary’ in its environmental policy making.57 Interviewees in other DGs commended DG 
Agriculture for its use of modern policy-making instruments.58 These include foresight, which 
is a process to identify possible future scenarios and develop policy directions in light of these 
scenarios.59 DG Agriculture’s process of re-making its identity in the expert, modern mould 
was, it seems, successful-- at least in the eyes of some. Its redefinition and creation of a new 
‘expert’ identity is closely linked with improving the wider image of the Commission with the 
public and thus being perceived as credible in providing the institutional framework for the 
                                                          
55 Ibid.  
56 (R10). 
57 (R17). 
58 (R3) and (R17). 
59 See more about foresight in research and innovation at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-and-
innovation/strategy/support-policy-making/support-eu-research-and-innovation-policy-making/foresight/about-
foresight-research-and-innovation_en  
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interaction of science and law as a part of co-production.60 This approach taken by DGs is 
aligned with Jasanoff’s proposition that knowledge and its production play an important part 
in shaping the social role or giving actors power or meaning.61 DG Agriculture’s effort to 
change its image feeds into the Commission’s efforts to distinguish itself as an evidence-based 
and credible policy provider, which will assist in regaining the trust of relevant stakeholders. 
 
Moreover, expertise as a distinctive feature of an identity provides officials with credibility and 
creates cohesive identity. Thus, co-production of expert identity becomes important in building 
a sense of common purpose among members of a group and ensures the highest level of 
independence in the provision of scientific knowledge intended for law. This is particularly 
important for the Commission, which is the locus of numerous different identities and interests. 
The Commission therefore needs to build this sense of common cause among its staff in order 
to overcome any challenges such a mixture of identities and interests may present. Developing 
an ‘expert’ identity achieves this end. Without prompting, interviewees across DGs and 
Commission services were able to identify this common purpose and its importance: 
 
Commission’s Legal Services: So, we have very committed people in the DGs. You have other DGs 
where people do whatever they want, but in Agri, Environment, Climate, SANTE, you have people who 
really believe in what they do and, indeed, sometimes the challenge is to use that fountain of knowledge 
in a relatively structured way. (R10) 
 
DG Research: The high-level group [sic - SAM] knows how science works, understands concepts in 
relation to evidence, knows how to communicate these ideas to the users. (R8) 
                                                          
60 See J.C. Juncker, ‘A New Start for Europe:  My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness  and Democratic Change’ 
- Political Guidelines  for the Next European Commission  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en.pdf and European Commission, Trust at Risk, 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e512c11b-e922-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1 
61 Jasanoff, n. 22 above, p. 39. 
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This community of shared purpose in co-production through identity building is also dependent 
on the levels of trust between those involved in co-production. Trust is essential where ‘risk is 
a part of the narrative’62 as it inevitably is in science-law co-production. As Jasanoff argues, 
who should be trusted and on what basis, become central issues for people seeking reliable 
information about the state of the world.63 Trust is also regarded as an important element for 
sustaining ‘individual and organisational effectiveness’ and ‘effective social interactions’.64 
The Commission recognized the importance of this value in its work with citizens which 
involves ‘trust in its integrity, trust in its purpose, and trust in its values’.65 Trust infuses 
different levels of interaction within the Commission in the environmental policy area, 
including: interactions between scientists and civil servants in the DGs; scientists and the 
private sector and Member States in collecting data; interactions between DGs and the Legal 
Service of the Commission; and finally the relationship between the Commission and the wider 
public. Without prompting, the interviewees highlighted the importance of trust in their social 
interactions throughout the legal drafting stage.  
 
So, at a certain moment, it boils down a lot to trust, because this is something I have learnt. I have to 
build trust and in particular when it comes to the environment, you do not build trust by being 
overconfident. You need to admit as a scientist that you may be wrong, and you need to understand that 
at a certain moment, emotions and fear are coming in and you have to deal with that. So, the aspect of 
citizen engagement, the aspect of – and I mean citizen engagement involvement in the true sense, I am 
not saying about informing people, that is not enough, but making people part of what you are 
developing, that also I sense is gaining a lot of importance right now. (R4) 
                                                          
62 J. Hawkins. ‘The Legitimisation of Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation: Power, Prejudice and Public Participation; 
(PhD Thesis, University of Bristol, 2012) at Chapter Three.  
63 Jasanoff n. 22 above, p. 29.  
64 A. Lawton, Environmental Taxation as a Form of Environmental Protection: Exploring the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment, (Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, April 2018) at 121.  
65 European Commission, n. 60 above, p. 7  
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This expert identity underpinned by trust between Commission officials facilitates the 
legislative process. Lawyers and scientists prefer to interact with officials whose expertise they 
trust. In building this relationship of trust, interviewees also emphasized the importance of 
interpersonal contact rather than relying on institutional affiliation or domain expertise of a 
person they work with. Cooperation and formal and informal networking are seen as key trust-
building exercises through which one can get to know the person. To that end, expert identity 
acts as a bridge that overcomes boundaries between staff from different professional domains 
such as scientists and lawyers, in particular lawyers in the Legal Service of the Commission 
and scientists in DGs. The expert identity also overcomes institutional affiliations between 
different DGs and services within the Commission. 
 
And then, in my case, it depends on who I’m working with. I would check more or less, there are some 
of the experts I trust more because I know they are very thorough and that’s something you learn with 
experience. (R11) 
 
Co-production of identity also entails the production of a particular kind of authority66 resulting 
from the fact that experts are associated with specialized and credible knowledge67. The 
interview data demonstrated that identity building through social interactions between 
scientists and lawyers is more likely to occur within forums recognized for their expertise and 
authority. Thus, the legislative process becomes contingent on expert identity. This is well 
illustrated by the JRC’s standing within the Commission. As the Commission’s in-house 
provider of scientific knowledge, the JRC is widely perceived by interviewees as ‘a very good 
                                                          
66 Peter Dear explains how the term expertise designates a particular kind of authority – See P. Dear, ‘Mysteries 
of State, Mysteries of Nature: Authority, Knowledge and Expertise in the Seventeenth Century’ in S. Jasanoff 
(ed.), States of Knowledge: the Co-production of Science and Social Order (Routledge, 2006), pp. 206-24, at p. 
207. 
67 Lynch, n. 19, at p. 161. 
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partner’ in the legislative process because it ‘attracts the best researchers’.68 As Alvesson points 
out, one of the main expressions of organizational identity is the ability of members to construct 
the perception of their organization having certain key characteristics distinctive from others 
and as possessing a ‘degree of continuity over a period of time and in varying circumstances’.69 
This perception of the JRC suggests that it has succeeded in doing just that; it has successfully 
co-produced a multi-faceted expert identity, both institutionally and among its individual staff. 
In this way, as well as being seen as a scientific institution that conducts research and provides 
scientific knowledge, the JRC successfully extended its mandate to provide institutional 
support to the Commission in the production of environmental law and policy. It thus began to 
take on dual roles, based on its expert identity: it is both an ‘organisation of science diplomacy’ 
that facilitates a dialogue in the legislative process and the ‘institutional memory for 
environmental issues’ within the European Commission.70 As one interviewee [from the JRC] 
put it: 
 
… the JRC is in its very origin an organization of science diplomacy, so whatever we are doing in terms 
of science is not only for the conception and implementation of policy, it has always [sic-been] a 
function also of dialogue. The dialogue can be between Member States of the EU, or regions in the EU, 
it can be between the EU and outside partners, but it can also be a local level, so in cities or regions, 
what have you. (R4) 
 
… I got that dossier on my table some three years ago, in the meantime at DG Environment they 
changed the director general, the director, the head of the unit, and the task officer twice in three years.  
Which means that in such a short time, I have become and my team has become the historic memory 
of what is or has been the development in terms of science and technology. (R4) 
 
                                                          
68 (R14). 
69 Alvesson, n. 54, above, p. 22. 
70 (R4). 
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Co-production of identities in the Commission also manifests itself in the emergence of new 
expert identities. As an example of an emerging institution, the Scientific Advice Mechanism 
(SAM) offers the opportunity to consider how co-production may be supported and, more 
pertinently to this article, the role that ‘expert’ identity may play in this process. SAM is 
perceived to offer a strong reinforcement to science-based policy making in the European 
Commission, especially in the environmental policy area. This new model, which replaced the 
Chief Scientific Advisor office, is seen as a more appropriate forum for giving tailored 
scientific advice to individual DGs. Due to its ability to provide advice in various forms such 
as opinions, recommendations or reports,71 SAM is regarded as an institution capable of 
providing comprehensive responses in the environmental policy area.72 Moreover, due to its 
unique organizational structure, which entails a high-level expert group of seven independent 
scientific advisors acting in their own personal capacity in cooperation with the consortium of 
European academies,73 SAM can be regarded as institution that offers independent advice. 
Such identification was clear from interviewees working with SAM, who emphasized that 
SAM provides more independent advice and opinions in addition to those offered by existing 
providers of scientific knowledge within the European policy-making space. Thus, co-
production of scientists’ identity within SAM renders their views as scientists more 
independent. The following extracts illustrate this well.  
 
                                                          
71 See Art 7 of the Rule of Procedure of the High Level Group of Scientific Advisors and Guidelines – how SAM 
produces scientific advice at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/sam/pdf/guidelines_how_sam_produces_scientific_advice.pdf#view=fit&pagemod
e=none  
72 In particular, it has a rapid response capacity, which it used, e.g., with the CO2 report  ‘Closing the Gap’. This 
opinion provided ‘added value’ to an already lengthy legislative process on CO2 emissions from vehicles: 
European Commission, Scientific Advice Mechanism, ‘Closing the gap between light-duty vehicle real-world 
CO2 emissions and laboratory testing’ (November 2016) available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/closing-gap-between-light-duty-vehicle-real-world-co2-emissions-and-
laboratory-testing_en 
73 Commission Decision of 16.10.2015 on the Setting up of the High Level Group of Scientific Advisors C(2015) 
6946 final. 
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I am tempted to believe that they (sic – Commissioners74) ask SAM when they really think an 
independent Commission advice might be helpful to them, and that can have many reasons. It can have 
reasons like that they believe it might be more trusted outside or in the parliament, for example, if it’s 
independent. It might be that they know that there have been for years and years and years collaborations 
between the JRC and maybe they want a fresh view. (R9) 
 
Co-production of identity may be affected by the status of expert and not just expert identity.75 
As Lynch explains, scientific or expert identity is ‘more than a label; it is a term of praise and 
mark of privilege’.76 Co-production of formalized knowledge through interaction of scientists 
and lawyers depends on the reputational identity of experts, which is best maintained by 
ensuring the credibility and independence of evidence provided in the process of legal drafting. 
Thus, identities become intertwined with the values structure of an institution as a venue of co-
production. Moreover, the personal values Commission officials embrace as scientists 
represent broad goals that motivate their behaviour.77 This is particularly salient to processes 
of legislative drafting in the environmental policy area, as the three relevant DGs (DG 
Environment, DG Agri and DG Research) engage with scientists from a variety of institutions 
such as the JRC, external experts from Member States, academics, and other international and 
regional organizations. Within this broader structure, the scientists in both the JRC and the 
SAM who were interviewed for this research, perceived themselves first and foremost as 
scientists and independent experts providing scientific advice; a self-identification quite in line 
with the organizational identity of those two institutions. According to interviewees, their 
expert identity is best expressed by presenting science in an unbiased manner which calls for 
                                                          
74 Emphasized by the author. 
75 Lynch, n. 19 above, p. 163. 
76 Ibid., p. 165. 
77 See L.S, Shalom, H. Schwartz & S. Arieli, ‘Personal Values, National Culture, and Organizations: Insights 
Applying the Schwartz Value Framework’ in N.M. Ashkanasy, C.P. M. Wilderom & M.F. Peterson (eds), 
Handbook of Organisational Culture and Climate (Sage, 2011), pp. 515-37 at p. 515. 
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‘identification of the level of uncertainty’78 or ‘the description of this degree of uncertainty’,79 
recognition of lack of knowledge or conflicting evidence. As interviewees put it: 
 
… the High-level group is not the Commission side, we are the independent experts who act as an expert 
group for the Commission but we are not part of the Commission and our views and opinions do not 
represent the view of the Commission. So I can speak only as an independent expert who is giving service 
to the Commission. (R7) 
 
… Also bear in mind we don’t – we avoid any political position or statement, that is not my job.  My job 
is science. (R4) 
 
Maintaining expert identity is particularly challenging for experts coming from Member States 
who, in addition to their identities as scientists, bring with them their national identities and 
member states’ preferences in regard to environmental legislation. Although the interviewees 
pointed out that, in principle, national experts ‘have to first of all express their national 
interests’,80 there were several instances in the legislative drafting process when those experts 
preferred to identify themselves as experts in their domains rather than be associated with their 
Member State. One example mentioned in the interviews was the drafting of the Guidance on 
the Application of the Environmental Impact Assessment for Large-Scale Transboundary 
Projects,81 which was done in cooperation with Member State experts. In interacting with civil 
servants and lawyers from the DG Environment, some experts decided that their name or their 
Member State would not be included in the final output in order to allow them to act more 
freely and provide independent advice.82 Similarly, interviewees pointed out that it is not 
                                                          
78 (R5). 
79 (R2). 
80 (R16) and (R14). 
81 European Union, 2013 at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/Transboundry%20EIA%20Guide.pdf  
82 (R18). 
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unusual for national experts in the standing committees to express views which are not shared 
by their national administrations.83 Thus, the identity of national experts as scientists is 
reaffirmed by interacting with Commission officials through legal and institutional processes, 
leaving aside their national identity. 
 
The Commission can also engage academics as external experts providing scientific advice. 
However, this group has thus far failed to interact with Commission officials and build a 
distinctive identity as experts producing scientific knowledge. The reasons for this lack of 
social engagement are two-fold. Firstly, interviewees opined that academics’ engagement is 
driven by different motivations, especially in terms of reward and recognition for their work 
and the potential scope of their contribution.84 It was pointed out in the interviews that the 
Commission is making an effort to identify opportunities and areas where the input of 
academics would be particularly beneficial.85 In certain areas of environmental law, such as 
nature conservation, at least some interviewees felt that more effort should be invested in 
engaging social scientists,86 thereby extending the Commission’s notion of science to be more 
inclusive of soft science experts as opposed to predominantly natural science experts. It was 
also felt by some interviewees that academics ‘need to use much simpler language to 
communicate’ and academic language is difficult to use for policy purposes.87  
 
In summary, the interview data supported the thesis that identities are co-produced whereby 
strong individual and organizational expert identities of the Commission officials in the DGs 
and other Commission services are reaffirmed and trump other identities existing within the 
                                                          
83 (R16). 
84 (R15). 
85 (R16). 
86 (R15). This was partly rectified with the establishment of SAM, which comprises social scientists as indicated 
by (R9).  
87 (R16). 
24 
 
Commission. This important finding contributes to our understanding of co-production in the 
EU context. Making identities as a first pathway of co-production serves various functions 
within the Commission. It enables the reaffirmation of identities and the emergence of new 
ones, which unites individual and different organizational units of the Commission with 
distinctive approaches to complex and science-based environmental issues. This expert identity 
impacts the legislative process as officials’ views of their interactions within the process is 
positively enabled by expert identity based on trust. Co-production of identities through mutual 
influence of science and law also results in moulding the traditional understanding of an expert 
as someone who has specialized skills and knowledge to include a more multi-faceted expert 
identity which allocates a social role to experts as scientists. Finally, identity that is co-
produced acts as a cohesive force between officials from different backgrounds and assists in 
building intra institutional trust among officials in different DGs and Commission services in 
producing credible scientific knowledge both through personal contact in formal and informal 
networking. As such, co-production of identities shapes values that underpin individual and 
organizational identities.88 
 
4.2. Making Institutions: The European Commission as a vehicle of co-production 
 
As Jasanoff argues, it would be inconceivable to think about co-production without regarding 
institutions which may assume many different roles at the nexus of science and law. Institutions 
act as venues for social interaction between different domains of expertise, repositories of new 
scientific knowledge and interpretation, and locations for the accreditation of evidence, law 
making, and dissemination of knowledge.89 Through institutions, different social actors have 
                                                          
88 See W.R. Scot, ‘The Adolescence of Institutional Theory’ (1987) 32(4) Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 
493-511, at 493-94. 
89 Jasanoff, n. 22 above, pp. 39-40. 
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access to problem-solving facilities, preferred forms of expertise, processes of inquiry, and 
methods for testing evidence.90 These different functions are solidified in the form of 
administrative routines.91 Jasanoff’s interpretation of the role of institutions in co-production 
aligns with the views of institutional theory scholars who examine institutions as social 
structures.92 Within that literature, institutions are regarded as primary venues for social 
interaction. Institutions matter in accounting for social behaviour and, to that end, they ‘are 
governance structures, embodying rules for social conduct’.93 Institutionalization is seen as a 
long-term process94 that involves putting in place standardized procedures and routinization of 
practices within an organization.95 These formalized structures become central to the creation 
and operation of institutions. 
 
In the EU environmental law and policy context, the Commission is recognized as the main 
vehicle of co-production between science and law.96 Although environmental policy was not 
conceived as a formal area of competence until 1986,97 by that time the Commission already 
had a track record in pushing for the adoption of environmental legislation on waste and air 
pollution as artefacts of co-production. These were the immediate environmental and health 
concerns at that time.98 Over the years, the Commission assumed many roles through which 
co-production of science and law occurred, manifesting in strengthening the knowledge base 
                                                          
90 Ibid., p. 40. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See W.R Scott, ‘Institutional Theory’ in G. Ritzer (ed), Encyclopedia of Social Theory (Sage, 2005), pp. 409-
14. 
93 Scott, n. 92 above, p. 408.  
94 See P. Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (Leadership in Administration. 
New York: Harper & Row, 1957), at p. 16. 
95 See more in V.A. Schmidt, ‘Institutional Theory’ in B. Badie, D. Berg-Schlosser & L. Morlino (eds), 
International Encyclopedia of Political Science (Sage, 2011), pp. 1188-1199. 
96 See J. McCormick, Environmental Policy in the European Union (Palgrave 2001). 
97 The Single European Act [1987] OJ L 169. 
98 E.g. Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, [1975] OJ L 194 and Council Directive 
80/779/EEC of 15 July 1980 on air quality limit values and guide values for sulphur dioxide and suspended 
particulates [1980] OJ L 229. 
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for policy making throughout the entire legal drafting process, thus increasing transparency, 
accountability and public engagement.99 Interviewees unanimously confirmed the 
Commission’s ‘genuine appetite’ for science as a part of its institutional culture. The following 
extract is illustrative: 
 
I think what is quite important to bear in mind is the Commission is profoundly, extensively using science 
advice always and has been doing so before Ms Glover100 and has been doing so before SAM. So, the 
Commission is a very… is relying on science, has always been relying on science to a very great extent. 
(R9) 
  
Co-production in the Commission at the nexus of science and law can be conceived as the 
result of formalization of institutional structures. The Commission is a highly institutionalized 
actor with routinized processes and practices. Over time, the Commission has refined some of 
these processes, including the latest procedural changes set out in the Commission’s Better 
Regulation Agenda, which applies to environmental law and policy as well as other areas of 
law making. 101 One of the interviewees described Better Regulation as a ‘toolbox’ establishing 
a complex mechanism for law making ‘which may take months, in some cases even years to 
be done’.102 Despite criticisms of Better Regulation and the time it takes to complete each phase 
                                                          
99 See COM(2015) 215 final; SWD (2017) 350 and COM(2001) 428 final. 
100 Anne Glover was the EU Chief Scientific Adviser until 2014. 
101 See COM(2015) 215 final; See also Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law‐Making OJ L 123(59) 12 
May 2016. This is how one of the interviews explains the legislative process (R14): “The legal drafting starts with 
the planning phase where a set of priorities are set out in the Working Programme, followed by a relatively short 
inception impact assessment which must be published for feedback. This is followed by the establishment of the 
interservice group which will steer the preparation of the impact assessment. In parallel, all three DGs conduct a 
very detailed internal analysis of scientific evidence, workshops with member states, working with JRC or external 
experts. In all those phases, the DGs are supported by the Legal Service of the Commission. After the proposal is 
adopted, the Commission is responsible for the implementation and evaluation of the legislation which is always 
externalised. Finally, the science permeates the enforcement process which is within the competences of the Legal 
Service in close cooperation with the DG environment and other DG responsible for cross-cutting issues.” See 
more on Better Regulation Agenda in C.M. Radaelli, ‘Halfway through the Better Regulation Strategy of the 
Juncker Commission: What Does the Evidence Say?’ (2018) 56 JCMS Annual Review, pp. 85–95 and A. Alberto, 
‘How Much Better is Better Regulation?’ Assessing the Impact of the Better Regulation Package on the European 
Union - A Research Agenda’ (2015) 6(3) European Journal of Risk Regulation, pp. 344-356. 
102 (R5). Similar conclusions were raised by (R6).  
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of the legislative process, interviewees emphasized two important positive developments of 
social interaction, both of which arise in the ex ante impact assessment phase. One is citizen 
engagement and its contribution to policy making through venues of co-production within the 
Commission, the absence of which formerly was a major source of criticism of the 
Commission’s institutional approach.103 For example, in the public consultation on the future 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, which was required as part of the Better Regulation 
approach, DG Agriculture received 320,000 public submissions, including a large number of 
submissions from individuals.104 Moreover, research confirmed closer and more valued 
engagement of JRC’s scientists from early stages of the legislative process as required by the 
Better Regulation Guidelines on impact assessment.105 Thus, co-production within the 
Commission also allows for the meaningful participation of scientific experts in designing 
specific environmental policies.  As one interviewee put it: 
 
Yes, I mean … just now, I have just contributed significantly to the impact assessment on the legal 
instrument for water re-use, so that is normal.  That is a different type of work, which I must say I am 
involved [in] now, I was not involved so much some years ago. So I noticed that there was a change, 
in particular with the Juncker Commission. I feel my work much more being appreciated, from that 
perspective, but it is also challenging for me, because I need to learn to think differently. (R4) 
 
As Jasanoff argues, through formalized processes of co-production institutions serve as 
vehicles for interpreting evidence, and thus standardizing methods and law making.106 This is 
particularly challenging for the Commission in the EU environmental context for two main 
                                                          
103 See COM(2015) 215 final: “the Commission will invite citizens or stakeholders to provide feedback within 
eight weeks: to feed these views into the legislative debate, the Commission will collect them and present them 
to the European Parliament and the Council”.  
104 (R6). 
105 Scientists are also part of the implementation and enforcement process. They also free to suggest new policy 
approaches based on the monitoring of how the legislation is implemented. See at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines-impact-assessment.pdf  
106 Jasanoff, n. 22 above, p. 40. 
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reasons. Firstly, the evidence collected and provided by Member States to the Commission’s 
in-house scientists varies in quality, sometimes considerably. The interviewees in JRC pointed 
out that their role is to search this collection of data for ‘harmonised datasets that cover the 
whole of Europe’107 and to develop methodologies that will allow for comparability of received 
data.108 Secondly, the legal drafting process is heavily influenced by both the Member States’ 
political preferences and the conflicting evidence they provide. This may seriously hinder the 
production of environmental law and policy within the Commission. At some point, final 
decisions may become political rather than scientific. However, the interviewees were able to 
point to evidence of co-production manifested in the legislative proposal where the views and 
contributions of all stakeholders were reflected. This becomes possible through the numerous 
phases of the formalized legislative process, which essentially enables compromise to be 
reached between the actors involved, thus helping to mitigate the challenges. As one 
interviewee put it: 
 
This is a procedure step by step [sic - so] you never arrive to that situation. You try to adjust the proposal 
according to various partners or stakeholders involved; so there is never the case when at the end of the 
cycle the Commission proposes something and everyone is shouting this is not. (R5) 
 
In order to serve as venues of co-production, institutions have to put in place methods and 
processes to ensure credibility of knowledge used in legal drafting.109 As scientific knowledge 
and its material embodiments are the products of social work,110 actors of co-production, such 
as the Commission in the EU environmental context, have to mitigate or reduce bias in 
providing credible knowledge. Credibility of evidence is closely linked to the question of 
                                                          
107 (R2). 
108 (R1) and (R2). 
109 See Jasanoff, n. 22 above, p. 40. 
110 Jasanoff, n. 3 above, pp. 2-3. 
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public trust in the Commission’s capacity to provide independent expert knowledge. To that 
end, the Commission deploys various methods of gathering and verifying evidence in the 
legislative process. Interviewees in DG Environment identified different institutional 
mechanisms for limiting bias in legal drafting. In certain areas of work, DG Environment staff 
rely heavily on studies and views prepared by recognized international scientific bodies. For 
example, for nature and the marine environment, these are the European Topic Centre and 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) respectively.111 Moreover, 
Commission officials often deliberately choose not to attend some of the meetings organized 
by international scientific bodies ‘to let them be scientific’.112 In those instances, the output, 
as artefacts of co-production, is regarded as ‘completely independent’ and it becomes 
‘tricky’for Member States to accept those reports if ‘they don’t like the result’, regardless of 
the fact that they are provided with independent scientific advice.113 Thus, the Commission’s 
deliberate strategy not to get involved in the work of other international organizations that 
provide scientific advice renders Member States less likely to question the validity of 
evidence and its deployment by the Commission in drafting legal proposals.  
 
In developing the Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM) as one of the more recent 
Commission initiatives, a considerable amount of work was put into designing structures and 
working methods which would allow for the mitigation of bias in providing scientific 
knowledge. The scientific objectivity and delivery of value-free scientific judgements has 
been widely recognized as a challenge in the policy-making process.114 To overcome this 
                                                          
111 (R15) and (R1). 
112 (R1). 
113 Ibid. 
114 E.J. Rykiel, ‘Scientific Objectivity, Value Systems, and Policymaking’ (2001) 51(6) BioScience, pp. 433–436 
and R. Costanza, ‘Visions, Values, Valuation, and the Need for an Ecological Economics: All Scientific Analysis 
is based on a “Preanalytic Vision” and the Major Source of Uncertainty about Current Environmental Policies 
Results from Differences in Visions and World View’ (2001) 51(6) BioScience, pp. 459–468. 
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challenge, SAM deploys a top-down approach with a High-level Group of seven scientists 
from both natural and social sciences at the top, working together with a consortium of 
transnational European science academies.115 In the first instance, SAM exclusively uses 
scientific evidence available in the public domain, while the limitation of bias is ensured 
through a variety of testing methods, which were described in interviews.116 SAM also uses 
methods which facilitate different forms of interaction:  
 
We attach a great deal of importance to the avoidance of bias in the production of the opinions, right? So, we 
want not only to enable examination of evidence which is comprehensive but also that it should not be biased, 
which means, by the way, not only looking at classic literature but using a variety of different methods to 
examine available evidence.  So, that might involve what we would call expert elicitation workshops, where 
you would capture ideas emerging from a representative sample of experts who have worked on the basis of 
a literature review. But then it might also involve bringing in practitioners, people who are involved in the 
implementation of whatever the legislation that you’re looking at is intended to achieve. (R8) 
 
Apart from the development of standardized processes and removal of bias within them, 
institutions as pathways of co-production also play an important role in ratifying new identities 
that have been produced through social interaction117. Institutional theory scholars point to the 
importance of individual identities in making institutions. Although most agree that individuals 
‘matter’ in this context, consensus on their role is lacking among institutionalist scholars. There 
is an understanding that ‘institutional structures persist while individuals come and go’, 118  
although some scholars emphasize that individuals also shape structures.119 This is also the 
                                                          
115 SAPEA (Science Advice for Policy by European Academies) consortium which consists of the 5 European 
Academy Networks Academia Europaea, ALLEA, EASAC, Euro-CASE and FEAM; See at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/sam/index.cfm?pg=about  
116 (R7) and (R8). 
117 Jasanoff, n. 22 above, p. 40. 
118 B.G. Peters, Institutional Theory: Problems and Prospects (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, 2000), pp. 
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case for the Commission, where leaders have reconciled the situational context with their own 
personality and objectives.120 The identity of Commission Presidents emerged as an important 
factor in some of the interviews conducted for this research. A number of interviewees pointed 
out that each new President of the Commission tries to leave their mark, which may affect the 
institutional culture of the Commission negatively or positively. The Commission President at 
the time of the interviews, Jean Claude Juncker, introduced a ‘new collaborative way of 
working’ whereby ‘each Commissioner is attached to one or several Vice-Presidents’.121 To 
this end, Juncker entrusted several policy areas to Vice-Presidents with the responsibility to 
direct and coordinate work across the Commission in those key areas,122 a move that 
interviewees perceived as significant. They pointed out that this organizational shift was 
introduced by the President of the Commission as a response to public opinion, lack of citizen 
involvement, and limited understanding of the Commission’s work. Some interviewees 
highlighted the Juncker Commission pledge to focus on ‘bigger issues’ while avoiding the 
regulation of smaller or ‘trivial things that don’t bring any added value’.123 However, as one 
interviewee pointed out, this approach disincentivized DGs to initiate new proposals as they 
had to ‘think three times before they propose’. 
 
[sic - Junker] also changed the logic of the legal making in the Commission. Initially, before him, for 
instance, my experiences were mostly with Barroso Commission, it was bottom up. A lot of initiatives, 
the services they were very creative, inventing a lot of things and proposing them up to the political level. 
Now… they …reversed this completely, there are political objectives fixed and…even the 
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Commissioners…their right of initiative is very much diminished compared with previous Commission. 
(R16) 
 
Finally, an important characteristic of each institution within the co-production model, 
especially in the area of environmental policy, is its ability to adapt to change and embrace 
technological and scientific advances. Jasanoff speaks about resilience and plasticity of 
institutions as a necessary requirement of co-production.124 A good example of this ability to 
change is the use of foresight in environmental policy making, which is a novel and important 
policy-making tool. One of the interviewees defined foresight as a tool ‘to see what’s going to 
happen in the future, what are the issues we need to look in the future, where do we need to get 
prepared for’.125 It is still in the early stages of conception within the Commission and there is 
still some underlying opposition in the Commission more widely to the structured use of this 
instrument.126 Some interviewees pointed out that, unlike many other DGs, DGs Environment 
and Agriculture are very willing to use foresight methodologies to identify emerging 
environmental or agricultural issues.127 Similarly, the JRC managed to fully institutionalize this 
tool, especially in the environmental policy area.128 The interviewees explained that this new 
tool feeds into a wider impact assessment exercise (emanating from Better Regulation) but is 
also aligned with the Commission’s commitment in the 7th Environmental Action Programme 
to be better prepared to deal with new and emerging environmental issues.129 According to 
interviewees, the wider opposition to the Commission’s use of this new tool may be explained 
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partly by the lack of certainty embedded in foresight, as well as the lack of political support for 
foresight as a result of a failure to understand the concept. Some interviewees addressed this:  
 
It’s very difficult to, how can I say, to make politicians to react based on foresight outcomes; it is not 
going to be easy. This will need to see, how the foresight develops in policy making, how much it will 
gain acceptance; for the moment gaining acceptance is not very high in the policy-making field. I would 
say in my judgement because we still need to convince policy makers that a) it is useful and b) that it is 
producing something … useful for the future, that it means it has an impact. For the moment it’s still 
considered as a kind of vague science, predictions. (R3) 
 
Yes, we are trying to do this here but of course it was incredibly difficult and one of the things people 
were telling me is that you need foresight to be near the top and I’m saying why, we need the team and 
then … by the time our voice reaches the Commission there are so many filters that it never actually 
never gets there. (R17) 
 
In brief, the interview data support the proposition that the Commission is a vehicle of co-
production of science and law in environmental policy. Through formalized processes the 
Commission serves as a venue for social interaction and mediation of different aims and 
interests. Thus, this finding of how co-production occurs in the Commission moves our 
understanding of the Commission from that of a purely technocratic and political body to a 
venue for social interaction. Unlike many other highly institutionalized organizations, the 
interaction of actors within the Commission legislative procedure is not pro forma, but allows 
for a genuine and constructive engagement between various actors, in particular scientists and 
citizens. Through these processes, in particular through problem solving, verification of 
evidence and lawmaking based on scientific evidence and knowledge, actors from different 
professional backgrounds determine the character of the Commission as an institution.  
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4.3. Making discourses within the European Commission 
 
Together with several other cross-cutting policies such as agriculture and research, 
environmental policy may be regarded as a key area where  making and maintaining a discourse 
between the different actors would be challenging. Environmental policy is an ‘evidence-
based’ field which relies on scientific knowledge from various sources and requires a discourse 
between various professions in order to make informed policy decisions. As Jasanoff points 
out, making discourses plays an important role in solving problems as we need to ‘find words 
for novel phenomena, give accounts of experiments, persuade sceptical audiences, and link 
knowledge to practice or action’.130 Language is the primary tool in building this discourse 
through ‘the appropriation of existing discourses’ and their subsequent retailoring to 
accommodate new needs.131 As Alvesson argues, language enables meaning to be constructed 
and transmitted and thus becomes embedded in discursive acts.132 
  
In developing this discourse, co-production provides a framework for scientific language to 
take ‘on board the tacit models of nature, society, culture and humanity that exist at any time 
in any given social order’.133 This process should occur as a result of mutual interplay between 
science and any social activity, whereby science will permeate the social process, especially in 
the policy context. Though Jasanoff argues the lack of strict dichotomy between science and 
social activity through co-production, the differences between science and law may prove more 
challenging in making discourses in this policy area. Some of the interviewees illustrated the 
                                                          
130 Jasanoff, n. 22 above, pp. 40-41. 
131 Ibid., p. 41. 
132 Alvesson, n. 54 above, p. 19. 
133 Jasanoff, n. 22 above, p. 41. 
35 
 
difficulty in co-producing discourse by pointing out that ‘policy is not made for scientists and 
scientists are not made for policy’.134  
 
One of the main challenges in enabling the discourse between science and law relates to how 
scientists and lawyers use language in problem solving regarding new phenomena. In the 
interviews, scientists recognized uncertainties surrounding many environmental issues that 
have to be acknowledged in the legal text as there is always a potential for ‘side-effects or 
conditional reaction to occur’.135 Moreover, as pointed out by interviewees who are scientists, 
lawyers find it difficult to ‘cast technical issues into law’.136 However, interviewed lawyers 
emphasized that they need to use precise and definitive language in imposing obligations on 
parties.137 This calls for a ‘clear scope of the legal obligation’ in line with the principle of legal 
certainty.138 This challenge was identified by some of the interviewees who gave their views 
on language at the nexus of science and law: 
 
It is a challenge though for the scientist to express him or herself in a way that you are clear and 
understood, and this has a lot to do with the concept and the notion of uncertainty and probability. So a 
lawyer always wants to have a yes or no, and a scientist is not capable of giving you that answer. (R4) 
 
With most environmental issues, very often there is no black and white answer. (R2) 
 
In producing this new language or modifying the existing one, Jasanoff identifies the use of 
specialized languages of particular domains, such as law or medicine.139 In the environmental 
                                                          
134 (R3). 
135 (R2). 
136 (R9). 
137 (R10), (R11) and (R12). 
138 (R10). See R. Brownsword & K. Yeung, Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and 
Technological Fixes (Hart Publishing, 2008). 
139 Jasanoff, n. 22 above, p. 41. 
36 
 
policy area, this new legal language should enable accurate translation of scientific knowledge 
into law. Thus, the aim of the discourse is to ‘re-tailor’ the language by accommodating 
differences between scientists and lawyers in denoting new scientific phenomena.140 However, 
legal language is perceived as highly formulaic and technical with its ‘own domain of use and 
particular linguistic norms’.141 This is especially pertinent to the formulation of legal 
definitions, which are often used in environmental legal texts to explain scientific concepts. In 
creating this discourse, interviews evidenced that scientists find it difficult to shoehorn science 
into rigid legal definitions while simultaneously acknowledging uncertainties and 
probabilities.142 In turn, lawyer interviewees underlined their own ‘tendency of trying to 
capture everything possible” which may lead to ‘definitions being broad’.143 
 
Interviewed scientists particularly noticed this difference in their own perception of legal 
language in making discourse. For example: 
 
And we see that now with the biotechnology as well, where we really have great lawyers in the 
Commission, digging themselves into this area, but it is bloody difficult because scientists do not work 
in legal definitions, so they use words in a way that is not in a legal definition… then they are unable to 
define that.” (R9) 
 
The recent scandal about nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from diesel vehicles144 was cited as 
an example of where the translation of science into legal definitions had failed: 
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I’m pretty sure that when the law was drafted in 2009, so to speak, [what] escaped from the initial 
meaning of what was wanted … in all of these legal definitions which have to be made in order to make 
actually a law, that you are defining so many things and you are obliged to define things, that this captures 
then only incompletely a technical reality. Maybe that difficulty exists in the social sphere as well, but 
that is, with the [carbon dioxide] CO2, with the NOx emissions, I’m pretty sure that this was facilitated 
by this problem that we had there that there was a gap between the lawmaking and the technical 
knowledge. (R9) 
 
In explaining social discourses as an instrument of co-production, Jasanoff argues that 
discourses such as law often incorporate or reinforce a tacit model or understanding of 
science.145 This is particularly important in judicial proceedings where judges today have to 
evaluate volumes of scientific evidence brought by the parties to a proceeding.  
 
The discourse in court proceedings is of great significance in EU infringement procedures 
where the Commission brings an action against a Member State for failure to comply with EU 
law.146 In this procedure, the Commission is represented by its Legal Service, which develops 
and facilitates a discourse between the Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). 
Members of the Commission’s Legal Service are entrusted with the demanding task of 
presenting scientific findings in a way that enables judges to follow and understand science in 
each case. One interviewee outlined this task: 
 
I think the chance for us, certainly in litigation, is very much on sometimes very complex technical and 
scientific issues that we have to be able to understand what this is really about in very simple terms, also 
to be able to explain, pass that message to the court in simple terms, because we’re all lawyers.  We don’t 
have the experience or the ability to work on a daily basis on these highly complex scientific issues, so 
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that is, I think, what our added value as lawyers is in the whole process of litigation, in this case, to be 
able to explain in a very layman manner to the court, eventually to the court, what this is about and what 
our position is… (R12) 
 
Thus, co-production of discourse requires significant institutional efforts in science-based 
policy areas in order to allow discourse to occur between actors from different professional 
domains.147 This is even more challenging in the EU environmental context with its numerous 
actors from different backgrounds, cultures, and pursuing different agendas. Jasanoff advocates 
standardization as a way of facilitating discourse,148 which at the EU level was best achieved 
by standardization of the policy-making processes through the Better Regulation Agenda. The 
Commission’s decision to set out different phases of the legislative process enables dialogue 
throughout the policy cycle, from initiation to implementation and enforcement.149 In the 
interviews, this dialogue was characterized as a ‘translation exercise’150 which happens 
throughout various stages of the legislative proposal.  
 
Throughout the legal drafting process in environmental policy, communication between the 
scientists from the JRC and the Commission officials in respective DGs is vital. The interviews 
illustrated that JRC scientists were aware of the need to convey their scientific findings in an 
accessible form, and saw their role as ‘trying to synthesize the knowledge and get the key 
message out’.151 They were thus self-consciously engaged in a process of translation. This is 
followed by a discourse between the civil servants in each DG, which involves discussion 
between civil servants from different professions, mainly scientists and lawyers in the three 
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selected DGs. At the enforcement stage, discourse takes place between the Legal Service and 
the civil servants in the DGs.  
 
The quality of dialogue within co-production depends on the knowledge and expertise of actors 
involved, as well as their perception of the importance of standardized processes. Interviewees 
emphasized that legal staff are highly qualified, especially in the DG Environment which 
facilitates the discourse between lawyers and scientists.152 In addition, achieving a balance 
between different professions forms part of the recruitment strategy of the individual DGs.153 
Dialogue is certainly facilitated by the Commission practice of having legal drafting done in 
mixed teams, hosting Commission officials from different professions in all three chosen DGs. 
More importantly, the involvement of the Legal Service from the very beginning of the legal 
drafting process not only furthers the development of a co-produced discourse but also allows 
the identification of controversial pieces of legislation that may end up in the court, or texts 
which may be subject to compromise between Member States:  
 
… Because the Commission is based on a lot of dialogues between DGs or with the Member States, with 
other stakeholders, you sometimes have compromised text and you need to understand at the end of the 
day what it means, because at the end there is only one text we can prove and it must make sense.  
Sometimes it doesn’t because of consultative ambiguity. People didn’t want to take side for the other, so 
you may have definition that doesn’t make sense, or no definition. (R10) 
 
Standardized processes are clearly an important means to facilitate discourse, but co-
production may also involve other forms of dialogue-building. An example is the SAM, 
established in 2015 with the mandate to provide scientific advice to the College of 
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Commissioners. Though SAM is not part of the regular legislative procedure, it assists the 
Commission in enabling discourse of environmental issues, not only between the scientists and 
the DGs but also between the Commission and the public.154 Some interviewees described 
SAM as a ‘synthesizer’, with the task of interpreting scientific knowledge for people who are 
not scientists.155 There is no formal requirement for Commissioners to ask SAM to provide 
scientific advice on environmental or other issues. Nonetheless, it is now becoming 
Commission practice to ask for SAM’s opinion, especially in regard to controversial or novel 
scientific issues.156 Once Commissioners seek SAM’s advice, dialogue becomes a means of 
formulating a policy response that will bridge the gap between law and empirical evidence in 
the legislative process. As one interviewee put it: 
 
What’s more important here is the process that we have, so in the early stages, we will be aware that a 
commissioner is thinking about asking the high-level group a particular question. And then we go through a 
fairly extensive process of discussing what that question means, scoping it out, trying to bottom out all the 
different elements of that question to see if it is amenable to the provision of scientific advice, but also to try 
to understand the various sub-questions that such a question might imply, and that results in the production 
of what we call a scoping paper, and that is the starting point from which the high-level group then eventually 
produces its opinion at the end.  So, that dialogue and exchange I think already helps in the eventual 
production of an opinion that is tailored to the needs of that DG. (R8) 
 
The interview data demonstrated the importance attached to facilitating a discourse in 
environmental policymaking and the process put in place to enable this discourse. Scientists 
and lawyers use language for different purposes, with scientists seeking to recognize 
uncertainties surrounding environmental issues, while lawyers use language to anticipate all 
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probable scenarios and guarantee legal certainty. The data evidenced that through co-
production of discourses, the Commission, with the important assistance of its Legal Service, 
successfully ensures that scientific knowledge is properly reflected into law that is fit for 
purpose and understandable. This is achieved by various formal and less formalized processes 
which involve highly qualified staff willing to engage in the ‘translation exercise’. 
 
4.4. Making representations 
 
The fourth pathway of co-production comprises ‘making representations’, namely, the physical 
output of co-production and, more particularly, how it is ‘made intelligible in diverse 
communities of practice’.157 Making representations is linked to the remaining three pathways 
of co-production and reveals the product of the interaction between science and other social 
activity, including law and science. This product of the legal process is not, as Jasanoff argues, 
‘a mirror of nature’158 but is a reflection of the context in which knowledge becomes embedded 
in institutions, practices, norms and material objects.159 In the legal context, the artefacts of co-
production are primarily legislation and court rulings, although in recent years policy 
documents and guidelines may also be regarded as emerging artefacts of this interaction.160 In 
the EU environmental context, the main product of the legislative procedure in the Commission 
is the legislative proposal which, once adopted by the College of Commissioners, is sent for 
adoption to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. Under Article 258 TFEU, the 
Commission has quasi-judicial powers to bring an action against a Member State which fails 
to comply with EU environmental law. Thus, the interactions of the Legal Service with judges 
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and Member States often take place within this enforcement context of the infringement 
procedure.  
 
Making representations carries its own challenges. As Jasanoff asserts, one has to make a 
decision ‘in the face of epistemic as well as normative uncertainty and how to strike a balance 
between the sometimes conflicting pressures of knowledge and norms’.161 Even though making 
representation is facilitated by other pathways of co-production, in particular institutions and 
discourses, a representation may not always contain scientific knowledge, or that knowledge 
may be lost or mistranslated in the legislative process. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure that 
the co-production output contains an acceptable level of knowledge resulting from the mutual 
interaction between law and science. In the context of the Commission, scientists from the JRC 
who are involved in all phases of the legal drafting process reported that they were able to 
identify their output in EU environmental legislation, usually in the annexes which form part 
of the legislative proposal. 
 
Very short answer, a very, very clear answer, I can directly now trace my input to what is going out as a 
process, as a proposal.  It is never part of the core regulation, it is always in the form of a technical annex. 
(R4) 
 
What then is the acceptable level of knowledge resulting from this broader engagement of 
various actors in the legislative process and embedded into the artefacts of co-production? This 
is best articulated by Jasanoff’s concept of serviceable truth which captures the outcomes of 
co-production.162 This concept is defined as ‘a state of knowledge that satisfies tests of 
scientific acceptability and supports reasoned decision making, but also assures those exposed 
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to risk that their interests have not been sacrificed on the altar of an impossible scientific 
certainty’.163 Hence, the interaction between the two disciplines should not only enable the 
preservation of credible science but also ensure that science fits the law for which it is intended. 
In order to achieve this objective, the policy maker needs to strike a balance between the 
scientific landscape of facts and the nurture and protection of humans and the environment in 
delivering the artefact of co-production.164 This is best done by assessing competing scientific, 
economic and social interests in reaching an informed decision.  
 
Over the years, the Commission has recognized scientific knowledge as a key element in the 
policy-making process, together with other social values and economic considerations.165 In 
their policy documents, the EU institutions speak about ‘science for policy’, which should 
concurrently maintain this scientific landscape of facts and ‘consider scientific evidence 
alongside societal values and political judgement when designing new policies’.166 This is 
closely linked to the question of deference given to science which, as Jasanoff notes, can be 
framed along a spectrum, from full and total deference to claims originating in science, to a 
point of little to no deference, where the ‘law’s core concerns for representation, accountability, 
and justice, as defined by legal norms, should take precedence over science’s claims to higher 
authority’.167 With regard to law making in the Commission, while consideration is given to 
both science and socio-political impact, it is difficult to identify where the Commission sits on 
the spectrum of deference. As pointed by interviewees, in making representations of co-
production, the Commission uses ex ante impact assessment as a credible tool to assess 
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competing interests, in line with the principles of the Better Regulation Agenda.168 In the 
context of EU nature law, the Commission is often faced with deeply rooted social traditions 
of certain Member States. One example given by interviewees is the long standing tradition of 
hunting in some Member States, which brings to the forefront competing social interests of 
hunting with environmental interests of preserving acceptable levels of bird species. As one 
interviewee put it: 
 
… hunting is now being debated in the context of a declining population.  There are still millions of 
turtle doves in Europe but they’re declining rapidly.  And, then the question is, ‘How do we actually 
manage in a way that actually reverses the decline still recognizing that there’s a social interest in terms 
of hunting as an activity, which is very deeply embedded, given that the major pressure is probably 
agriculture, but then hunting is not sustainable’?  And, one of the issues then is, ‘How do we determine 
the sustainability of hunting?’ So, that requires scientific understanding of population dynamics, health, 
cleanse… and it requires modelling. (R15) 
 
This ‘science for policy’ concept advocated by the Commission requires policy makers, 
including both scientists and lawyers, to leave their comfort zone and embrace different ways 
of thinking about competing interests. This was identified by some of the interviewees who 
found it challenging but at the same time rewarding to think about economic interests in making 
an informed decision based on science.  
 
A simple example, for instance, you are not used as a scientist at a first stage to think about economic 
impact. I mean very simply if I am making a threshold for removal of a pollutant this has an economic 
impact because you have to pay, you have to invest energy, you have to get the technology to obtain this.  
And I wasn’t used as a scientist so much to think about these lines.  And this has changed, and this is 
quite rewarding, because it gives also a monetary figure to my work, in a sense. (R4) 
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Jasanoff also emphasizes the influence of history, politics and culture on making 
representations,169 and politics poses a particular challenge in the EU context. The concept of 
‘serviceable truth’ in pursuit of the artefact of representation implies reasoned decision making 
that considers various political interests without jeopardizing the scientific knowledge that 
needs to become part of the legislative proposal. This is particularly relevant to legislative 
drafting in EU environmental policy where there is always a degree of uncertainty and where 
numerous actors, especially the Member States, will have their own policy preferences. 
Interviewees pointed out that, in areas such as agriculture, a policy maker must also examine 
various other interests involved, such as the impact of a decision on small farmers, the forestry 
industry, and so on.170 The interviewees confirmed that these political considerations form part 
of the legal drafting process in the Commission.  
 
It’s not impacted by – directly by the preferences of Member States but what… we would have a kind of 
reality check because if one proposal is not likely to fly politically in the Council, we’d better be realistic 
from the outset. (R6) 
 
In reaching this ‘serviceable truth’, the interviewees maintain that all those decisions are 
grounded in robust science without ever wiping out or losing something in translation from 
science into law.171 This reaffirms the Commission’s deference to scientific claims, which 
aligns with earlier finding that the Commission has a ‘general appetite for science’. This was 
strongly echoed in interviews with scientists who try to alleviate the pressure that the 
Commission experiences in mediating different voices and interests by providing different 
options or scenarios which do not jeopardize science on account of different political 
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preferences. In each of these scenarios JRC scientists try to describe ‘the degree of uncertainty 
that comes with a certain prediction or a certain scenario’ which usually involves identification 
of the two extreme and one middle ground scenario.172 
 
The compromise or what we call options or alternative scenarios are based on what we are doing, are 
based on science. (R5) 
 
Results of the empirical research demonstrated the capability of the Commission to produce 
the artefacts of environmental co-production which incorporate and aggregate input from 
scientists as well as political preferences and social interests. Thus, through making 
representations as the final pathway of co-production, scientific knowledge shaped by social 
processes within the Commission becomes embedded in the legal artefacts.173 More 
importantly, the final outcome of co-production does not sacrifice scientific evidence to 
political preferences and provides credible input into the legislative process. This 
demonstrates that the Commission effectively ensures the incorporation of science into law 
as an artefact which is fit for purpose and which is legitimized by the inclusion of relevant 
stakeholder interests. Finally, these findings foster some understanding of the level of 
deference the Commission gives to scientific claims made in the legislative process. There is 
no doubt that the legislative process needs to be substantiated by objective and credible 
scientific knowledge; thus strongly prioritizing scientific claims in Jasanoff’s spectrum of 
deference. However, the input of context through weighing historical, political and social 
influences on representation is reflected in the artefacts of co-production.   
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5. Conclusion  
 
The interaction of science and law is particularly significant in areas of legal regulation heavily 
based on scientific input, such as environmental policy. The extent and method of how science 
is incorporated and reflected into law becomes even more challenging in the EU multi-level 
policy-making arena. This empirically grounded study provides us with significant insights 
into the Commission’s modus operandi in acting as a nexus between science and law in 
environmental policy making. As evidenced by the study, the Commission can be seen as a 
vehicle of co-production of science and law in EU environmental policy. The Commission 
actively pursues strategies that can be classified within the four pathways of co-production, 
including its ability to make identities, institutions and discourse, which results in artefacts of 
co-production reflected in legislation that is fit for purpose. These four pathways are 
underpinned by the value-based institutional culture that nurtures trust and independence both 
among relevant stakeholders and the Commission and European citizens.  
 
The article deployed Jasanoff’s theoretical framework of co-production as an explanatory 
model to examine how the European Commission engages as a vehicle of co-production and 
facilitates the interaction of scientific evidence and environmental law. This theory was mainly 
applied in social science and remains under-utilized in legal research, particularly empirical 
legal research. However, this study confirms the value and applicability of the co-production 
concept to the growing area of legal research in science-based policies. The model provides us 
with a framework for evaluating the capacity of an institution, in this case the European 
Commission, to gather and assess scientific input and subsequently incorporate it in a 
legislative proposal that reflects social and political interests. This article concludes that, in 
facilitating co-production, the Commission enables the social and natural order to be produced 
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together. An opportunity for further research could entail further testing of this theory by 
undertaking empirical research of co-production within the European Parliament and the 
Council as the legislators acting upon legal proposals prepared by the Commission. 
Furthermore, this framework can be further applied to policy making across all EU science-
based policy sectors, such as research and health protection, but also to broader social processes 
that incorporate scientific knowledge into law. 
 
This empirical study not only has academic value by examining the applicability of different 
theoretical models, but is also significant from a policy perspective. Though extensive work 
has been undertaken in the past on the functioning of the Commission especially by political 
scientists, there is limited knowledge and understanding of how scientific evidence becomes 
part of the legislative drafting prepared by the Commission. To that end, this study has a two-
fold significance. It firstly has empirical value by opening up the black box on processes and 
methods that enable the interaction of science and environmental law in the Commission. The 
Commission established and, over time, refined formal and informal processes that enable 
genuine participation of numerous actors. Coupled with a recruitment policy that employs 
highly qualified staff across different professions and strong in-house scientific and legal 
expertise, this interaction allows for a constructive discourse in translating scientific input into 
law which will reflect wider social, economic and political interests. Secondly, the study 
reveals the applicability of the co-production model to policy making in the Commission. 
Multi-faceted identities are created, in which expert identity is still predominant. Through 
verification of evidence and the methodology of the policy-making process, the Commission 
acts as an institutional venue for co-production. This expertise and the policy-making process 
result in a discourse that supports the creation of representations which integrate both scientific 
evidence and expertise into legislative output. 
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These findings are linked to another contribution of this article. The study of the Commission 
at the interaction of science and law in environmental policy engages with the wider question 
of deference given to science in environmental policy making. As evidenced by the empirical 
data, during legislative drafting the Commission gives important consideration to science, 
while at the same time it assesses the political, economic and social impact of each measure. 
Thus, the artefacts of co-production embedded into legislation, case law and soft law should 
reflect the social interactions between science and law without jeopardising the quality and 
objectivity of scientific evidence translated into law. However, this study does not identify 
where the Commission sits on the spectrum of deference as identified by Jasanoff. An 
examination of the level of deference paid to science as opposed to other competing claims 
would be a valuable avenue for further research. Related to this question is the issue of what 
constitutes neutral science in policy making, as science is in itself value-laden. The 
interviewees perceive themselves as independent and using ‘objective science’. They do not 
regard themselves as pursuing any particular agenda or using science to support Commission 
or national preferences. However, as science is not value-free, this study opens a further line 
of inquiry into how Commission officials in this policy area understand value-free scientific 
judgment within this context.174 
                                                          
174 See Rimkutė & Haverland n. 17 above. Those authors consider some similar questions in relation to external 
experts.  
